Labor →
- 12 Feb 2013
- Working Paper Summaries
Do Bonuses Enhance Sales Productivity? A Dynamic Structural Analysis of Bonus-Based Compensation Plans
Personal selling is a primary marketing mix tool for most B2B firms to generate sales. Yet there is little research on how the compensation plan motivates a sales force and affects performance. This paper develops and estimates a dynamic structural model of sales force response to a compensation plan with various components: salary, commissions, lump-sum bonus for achieving quotas, and different commission rates beyond achieving quotas. Overall, the analysis helps assess the impact of (1) different components of compensation and (2) the differential importance of periodic bonuses on performance on different segments of sales people. Key concepts include: A quota-bonus scheme used by a firm increases performance of the sales force by serving as intermediary goals and pushing employees to meet targets. Features such as overachievement compensation reduce the problems associated with sales agents slacking off when they get close to achieving their quota. Quarterly bonuses serve as a continuous evaluation scheme to keep sales agents within striking distance of their annual quotas. In the absence of quarterly bonuses, failure in the early periods to accomplish targets causes agents to fall behind more often than in the presence of quarterly bonuses. Thus, a quarterly bonus serves as a valuable sub-goal that helps the sales force stay on track in achieving their overall goal. Quarterly bonuses are especially valuable to low performers. Overachievement commissions increase performance among the highest performers. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 27 Nov 2012
- Working Paper Summaries
No Margin, No Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for Pro-Social Tasks
Organizations from large corporations to NGOs use a range of nonfinancial performance rewards to motivate their employees, and these rewards are highly valued. While theory has suggested mechanisms through which nonfinancial incentives can elicit employee effort, evidence on the mechanisms, and on their effectiveness relative to financial incentives, remains scarce. This paper helps to fill this gap by providing evidence from a collaboration with a public health organization based in Lusaka, Zambia, that recruits and trains hairdressers and barbers to sell condoms in their shops. This setting is representative of many health delivery programs in developing countries where embedded community agents are called upon to deliver services and products, but finding an effective way to motivate them remains a significant challenge. Findings show the effectiveness of financial and nonfinancial rewards for increasing sales of condoms. Agents who are offered nonfinancial rewards ("stars" in this setting) exert more effort than either those offered financial margins or those offered volunteer contracts. Key concepts include: Nonfinancial rewards can motivate agents in settings where there are limits to the use of financial incentives. Nonfinancial rewards elicit effort by leveraging the agents' pro-social motivation and by facilitating social comparisons among agents. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 20 Nov 2012
- Working Paper Summaries
Pay Harmony: Peer Comparison and Executive Compensation
This paper demonstrates how horizontal wage comparisons within firms and concerns for "pay harmony" affect firm policies in setting pay for executives. Using a rich dataset of pay practices for the senior-most executives within divisions, Gartenberg and Wulf ask whether horizontal comparisons between managers in similar jobs affect pay. The authors also evaluate evidence in support of a tradeoff between pay harmony and performance pay. Findings are consistent with the presence of peer effects in influencing pay policies for executives inside firms. These results contribute to the ongoing policy debate on the consequences of transparency and mandatory information disclosure and potential ratchet-effects in executive pay. For practitioners involved in designing the structure of executive compensation and pay disclosure policies for firms -- including compensation committee directors, senior human resource executives, and compensation consultants -- it is important to recognize the tradeoff between the incentive effects of performance-based pay and costs of peer comparison that arise from unequal pay when designing executive wage contracts. The research also raises questions on the costs of pay disclosure and on labor markets more generally. Key concepts include: Pay policies of firms respond to concerns about internal equity. An SEC ruling in 1992 led to greater awareness of pay and greater peer comparison throughout all managerial ranks, particularly in geographically-dispersed firms that had natural information barriers prior to the ruling, as well as in firms with less ex ante pay disclosure. From the perspective of firms, the consequences of increased pay disclosure may range from pay ratcheting to aggregate shifts in worker effort or firm-specific investments and turnover. From the perspective of employees, increased pay disclosure may influence decisions to join firms and shift the relative importance of internal and external benchmarks, thereby having larger labor market consequences. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 12 Nov 2012
- Research & Ideas
Pay Workers More So They Steal Less
New research by professor Tatiana Sandino confirms what many top companies have long believed: Good wages and benefits are linked to a company's low turnover and to happier, more honest workers. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 30 Aug 2012
- Working Paper Summaries
Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers
Recent research presents convincing evidence that incentives rewarding loan origination may cause severe agency problems and increase credit risk, either by inducing lax screening standards or by tempting loan officers to game approval cutoffs even when such cutoffs are based on hard information. Yet to date there has been no evidence on whether performance-based compensation can remedy these problems. In this paper, the authors analyze the underwriting process of small-business loans in an emerging market, using a series of experiments with experienced loan officers from commercial banks. Comparing three commonly implemented classes of incentive schemes, they find a strong and economically significant impact of monetary incentives on screening effort, risk-assessment, and the profitability of originated loans. The experiments in this paper represent the first step of an ambitious agenda to fully understand the loan underwriting process. Key concepts include: High-powered incentives that penalize the origination of non-performing loans while rewarding profitable lending decisions cause loan officers to exert greater screening effort, approve fewer loans, and increase the profits per originated loan. In line with predictions, these effects are weakened when deferred compensation is introduced. More surprisingly, they find that incentives actually have the power to distort loan officers' perceptions of how a loan will perform. More permissive incentive schemes lead loan officers to rate loans as significantly less risky than the same loans evaluated under pay-for-performance. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 21 May 2012
- Research & Ideas
OSHA Inspections: Protecting Employees or Killing Jobs?
As the federal agency responsible for enforcing workplace safety, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration is often at the center of controversy. Associate Professor Michael W. Toffel and colleague David I. Levine report surprising findings about randomized government inspections. Key concepts include: In a natural field experiment, researchers found that companies subject to random OSHA inspections showed a 9.4 percent decrease in injury rates compared with uninspected firms. The researchers found no evidence of any cost to inspected companies complying with regulations. Rather, the decrease in injuries led to a 26 percent reduction in costs from medical expenses and lost wages—translating to an average of $350,000 per company. The findings strongly indicate that OSHA regulations actually save businesses money. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 28 Mar 2012
- What Do You Think?
Are Factory Jobs Important to the Economy?
Summing Up: The manufacturing field is key to a strong economy, but a renewed focus on the industry will not necessarily lead to significant job growth, Jim Heskett's readers say. What do you think? Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 07 Feb 2012
- Working Paper Summaries
Earnings Management from the Bottom Up: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives Below the CEO
Many studies as well as anecdotes document a link between the structure of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and various measures of earnings manipulation. In this paper, HBS professors Oberholzer-Gee and Wulf analyze all components of compensation packages for CEOs and for managers at lower levels in a large sample of firms over more than 10 years, between 1986 and 1999. Results suggest that the effects of incentive pay on earnings management vary considerably by both type of incentive pay and position. Overall, it appears that the primary focus of compensation committees on equity incentives for CEOs overlooks a critical component in curbing earnings manipulation. If one wanted to weaken incentive pay to get more truthful reporting, diluting bonuses-particularly that of the chief financial officer (CFO)-would be the place to start. This may be the first study to analyze the relationship between CEO, division manager, and CFO compensation and earnings management. Key concepts include: It is important to look at positions below the CEO because it is unclear if all or even most financial misreporting is decided at the top. In addition to division managers, the importance of the CFO's role in financial reporting and the numerous recent corporate fraud cases suggest that CFOs can significantly affect accounting quality. Companies report significantly higher discretionary accruals and excess sales and have a higher incidence of future lawsuits when CFOs are paid larger bonuses. Importantly, the magnitudes of these effects are much larger for CFOs in comparison to both CEOs and division managers. Since the quality of financial reporting is difficult to assess, the researchers have used various measures of earnings manipulation in this study, including discretionary accounting accruals, end-of-year excess sales, and class action litigation. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 04 Jan 2012
- What Do You Think?
Income Inequality: What’s the Right Amount?
Summing Up Comments were large in number and broad of opinion reflecting on Professor Jim Heskett's question, Does income inequality promote or stunt economic growth? Is there a "right" right amount of income disparity? Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 09 Nov 2011
- Working Paper Summaries
CEO Bonus Plans: And How to Fix Them
Discussions about incentives for CEOs in the United States begin, and often end, with equity-based compensation. After all, stock options and (more recently) grants of restricted stock have comprised the bulk of CEO pay since the mid-1990s, and the changes in CEO wealth due to changes in company stock prices dwarf wealth changes from any other source. Too often overlooked in the discussion, however, is the role of annual and multiyear bonus plans—based on accounting or other non-equity-based performance measures—in rewarding and directing the activities of CEOs and other executives. In this paper, Kevin J. Murphy and Michael C. Jensen describe many of the problems associated with traditional executive bonus plans, and offer suggestions for how these plans can be vastly improved. The paper includes recommendations and guidelines for improving both the governance and design of executive bonus plans and, more broadly, executive compensation policies, processes, and practices. The paper is a draft of a chapter in Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2012), CEO Pay and What to Do About it: Restoring Integrity to both Executive Compensation and Capital-Market Relations, forthcoming from Harvard Business School Press. Key concepts include: While compensation committees know how much they pay in bonuses and are generally aware of performance measures used in CEO bonus plans, relatively little attention is paid to the design of the bonus plan or the unintended consequences associated with common design flaws. These recommendations for improving executive bonus plans focus on choosing the right performance measure; determining how performance thresholds, targets, or benchmarks are set; and defining the pay-performance relation and how the relation changes over time. In the absence of "clawback" provisions, boards are rewarding and therefore providing incentives for CEOs and other executives to lie and game the system. Any compensation committee and board that fails to provide for the recovery of ill-gained rewards to its CEO and executives is breaching another of its important fiduciary duties to the firm. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 06 Sep 2011
- Research & Ideas
How Small Wins Unleash Creativity
In their new book, The Progress Principle: Using Small Wins to Ignite Joy, Engagement, and Creativity at Work, authors Teresa M. Amabile and Steven J. Kramer discuss how even seemingly small steps forward on a project can make huge differences in employees' emotional and intellectual well-being. Amabile talks about the main findings of the book. Plus: book excerpt. Key concepts include: Of all the factors that induce creativity, productivity, collegiality, and commitment among employees, the single most important one is a sense of making progress on meaningful work. Seemingly small signs of progress will induce huge positive effects on employees' psyches. On the other hand, seemingly small setbacks will induce huge negative effects. The catalysts that induce progress include setting clear goals; allowing autonomy; providing resources; giving enough time-but not too much; offering help with the work; learning from both problems and successes; and allowing ideas to flow. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 23 Mar 2011
- Working Paper Summaries
Do US Market Interactions Affect CEO Pay? Evidence from UK Companies
CEOs of UK firms receive higher total compensation if their companies have interactions with US product, capital, and labor markets. Moreover, the compensation package is often adopted from American-style arrangements, such as the use of incentive-based pay. Researchers Joseph J. Gerakos (University of Chicago), Joseph D. Piotroski (Stanford), and Suraj Srinivasan (Harvard Business School) analyzed data on the compensation practices of 416 publicly traded UK firms over the period 2002 to 2007. Key concepts include: The reason to compare similarity with the level and style of US pay is because CEOs of US companies typically are among the highest paid in the world. The UK firms' interactions with US markets were measured on four variables: the relative importance of US sales to the firm, the level of prior US acquisition activity, the presence of a US exchange listing, and the US board experience of the firm's directors. All four US market interaction variables correlated with greater pay, but only US operational activities (sales and acquisitions) were associated with pay similar to US-style contracts. The increased compensation alleviates internal and external pay disparities arising from the presence of US operations and businesses, and compensates CEOs for bearing the additional risk and responsibility associated with exposure to foreign securities laws and legal environments. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 28 Dec 2010
- Working Paper Summaries
The Psychological Costs of Pay-for-Performance: Implications for Strategic Compensation
In studying pay-for-performance-based compensation systems, economic scholars often adhere to agency theory, which hypothesizes that firms should prominently use performance-based compensation—it alleviates the problems of employee "shirking" and ensures highly skilled employees' desire to work for the company. However, firms use performance-based pay far less frequently than agency theory predicts. This paper posits that the psychological costs of pay-for-performance systems often dominate their benefits to firms, and proposes an integrated theory of strategic compensation that takes into account the economic and psychological benefits and costs of pay-for-performance. Research was conducted by Harvard Business School professors Francesca Gino and Ian Larkin, and Lamar Pierce of Washington University. Key concepts include: Three psychological factors most prominently influence compensation strategy: social comparison processes, overconfidence, and loss aversion on the part of employees. Social comparison processes imply that employees care not only about their own pay but also about the pay of relevant others. If employees are overconfident about their abilities, which is often the case, they may become unmotivated or even engage in sabotage if they perceive unfair pay gaps between their and others' pay. Loss-averse employees are more motivated by potential failure to meet sometimes arbitrary levels of desired pay than they are by potential gains. This phenomenon implies that employees may work less hard than firms desire even if paid for performance. In response to these psychological factors, firms rely on flat salaries or "scale-based" systems where the pay-for-performance relationship is much less prominent than predicted by agency theory. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 13 Dec 2010
- Research & Ideas
Managing the Support Staff Identity Crisis
Employees not connected directly to profit and loss can suffer from a collective "I-am-not-strategic" identity crisis. Professor Ranjay Gulati suggests that business managers allow so-called support function employees to become catalysts for change. Open for comment; 0 Comments.
- 11 Oct 2010
- Research & Ideas
It Pays to Hire Women in Countries That Won’t
South Korean companies don't hire many women, no matter how qualified. So multinationals are moving in to take advantage of this rich hiring opportunity, according to new research by professor Jordan Siegel. Key concepts include: Employing women who are excluded by their own countries' labor markets is a growing trend for international affiliates of global multinational companies. Using data from South Korea, researchers showed that a 10 percent nominal increase in the percentage of female managers (at the level of the then-prevailing glass ceiling) was associated with a 1 percent nominal increase in ROA. Multinational firms that recruit females into management roles at their local affiliates face the possibility of upsetting local male employees, partners, and customers who don't approve of women in executive roles. In many instances, multinational firms hired and promoted female managers in a discriminatory host market at a far higher rate than they employed female managers in their own home markets. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 21 Apr 2010
- Working Paper Summaries
Why Do Firms Use Non-Linear Incentive Schemes? Experimental Evidence on Sorting and Overconfidence
The use of "non-linear" performance-based incentive contracts is very common in many business environments. The most well-known example is salesperson compensation, though many other types of performance-based pay, including stock options, bonus systems based on defined metrics, and pay based on subjective performance, often exhibit non-linear characteristics. Research has demonstrated that non-linear incentives are highly distortionary because employees manipulate their work in order to maximize their pay. While some scholars have recommended that companies stop using non-linear incentives, little research has been done to investigate the possible benefits of non-linear schemes. In this paper, HBS professor Ian Larkin and Ross School of Business professor Stephen Leider (HBS PhD '09) explore the role that the behavioral bias of overconfidence may play in explaining the prevalence of non-linear incentive schemes. They conclude that the linearity or non-linearity of an incentive system could play an important role in sorting employees according to their level of confidence; in addition, there may be three possible benefits to having overconfident employees. Key concepts include: First, overconfidence is valuable for certain job functions; for example, salespeople lose deals much more frequently than they win them, and being overconfident may help them be effective despite the many failures they go through. Second, absent non-linear contracts, employers and overconfident employees may have a difficult time agreeing to a compensation scheme in the first place. Non-linear systems allow employers and employees with fundamentally different beliefs form compensation agreements. Third, the non-linearity of an incentive system may allow firms to lower their wage bill. A convex scheme, for example, may allow firms to take advantage of overconfident employees' systematic and persistent bias toward believing they will perform well. The study confirms recent findings in psychology literature that overconfidence is not an individual trait so much as a trait around a specific task. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 18 Mar 2010
- Working Paper Summaries
Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives
Do different kinds of firm ownership drive the adoption of different managerial practices? HBS professor Raffaella Sadun and coauthors focus on the difference between the two most common ownership modes, family firms and firms that are widely held, namely that have no dominant owner. They find that the greater weight attached by family firms to benefits from control induces a conflict of interest between family-firm owners and high-ability, risk-tolerant managers. Key concepts include: Family firms systematically offer low-powered incentive contracts to external managers compared with widely held firms. The differences are economically large. Where incentives are more powerful, managers exert more effort, are paid more, and are more satisfied. Firms that offer high-powered incentives are associated with better performance. This result holds even after controlling for the type of ownership. Economies where family firms prevail because of institutional or cultural constraints are also economies where the demand for highly skilled, risk-tolerant managers languishes. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 02 Nov 2009
- Research & Ideas
Shareholders Need a Say on Pay
"Say on pay" legislation now under debate Washington D.C. can be a useful tool for shareholders to strengthen the link between CEO pay and performance when it comes to golden parachutes, says Harvard Business School professor Fabrizio Ferri. Here's a look at how the collective involvement of multiple stakeholders could shape the future of executive compensation. Key concepts include: "Say on pay" means shareholders hold an annual advisory vote on executive pay based on a report prepared by the firm's board of directors. Say on pay might create more communication and awareness between shareholders and boards because it forces both entities to grapple with an extremely complex issue. Ferri advocates tailoring executive pay to a company's individual circumstances. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
- 03 Sep 2009
- What Do You Think?
Are Retention Bonuses Worth the Investment?
There is a time and place for retention bonuses but they should be used sparingly, wrote many respondents to this month's column, says Professor Jim Heskett. Others challenged the value of bonuses, and suggested compelling alternatives. (Online forum now closed; next forum begins October 2.) Closed for comment; 0 Comments.
How to Demotivate Your Best Employees
Many companies hand out awards such as "employee of the month," but do they work to motivate performance? Not really, says professor Ian Larkin. In fact, they may turn off your best employees altogether. Closed for comment; 0 Comments.